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The experience of costly disinflation in the early 1980s hascontradicted
the central policy promise of the new classical macroeconomicsjust as sharply
as the experience of accelerating inflation in the l970s contradicted the
chief promise of earlier thinking. Much of the attractiveappeal of each
approach rested on its holding out the prospect of successfully dealing
with the foremost macroeconomic policy issue of its time —unemployment
in the earlier case, and inflation more recently —withoutincurring the
costs that previous thinking associated with effective solutions. Inflation
did accelerate in the l970s, however, and now the real economic costs of
disinflation have proved remarkably in line with conventional estimates
antedating the new classical macroeconomics. The implication of this
unfortunate outcome is not, of course, simply to return to earlier approaches,
but to retain what is theoretically appealing about the methodology of the
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For a would—be science with no laboratory, whatever experiments
nature provides carry great weight. For economics, and especially for
macroeconomics, the experience of actual economies not only motivates ideas
but also sometimes disconfirms them. When actual economic events are
sufficiently compelling, they can even change long-established thinking
or reverse the momentum of newer approaches just establishing themselves.
The economic experience of the early 1980s in the industrialized western
countries, and in the United States in particular, may well be having just
that effect. Real economic activity abated sharply during this period,
bringing record levels of both unemployment and idle industrial capacity.
Restrictive monetary policy aimed at slowing price inflation was a key
element, probably the key element, in producing this decline. Moreover,
at least in the United States after 1980, disinflationary monetary policy
was hardly a surprise.
This combination of circumstances has had, and should have, a powerful
influence on macroeconomic thinking, in large part because it directly
contradicts the predominant new line of macroeconomic research developed
in the 1970s —the "new classical macroeconomics." The central policy
conclusion of the new classical macroeconomics is that real economic activity
is invariant to monetary policy actions which are anticipated in advance.
The corollary of this principle with special relevance to the leading economic
policy debate of the past decade is that disinflation produced by tight
monetary policy need not be costly. The apparent contradiction between theprimary policy message of the new classical macroeconomics and the actual
economic experience of the early 1980s has already dulled the appeal of this
direction of thinking to a noticeable extent.
The thesis of this essay is that the contradiction between recent
economic experience and the new classical macroeconomics is not just apparent
but real, and that it represents a disconfirmation at least as compelling
as the set of events which led to disillusionment with the previously
prevailing macroeconomic consensus and thereby provided the attraction of
the new classical macroeconomics in the first place. The implication that
follows for macroeconomic research is not, of course, to return without
modification to that earlier set of views. Instead, it is that still further
approaches, of which some are already at hand, offer the best vehicle to
retain what remains attractive about the methodology of the new classical
macroeconomics yet derive policy conclusions consistent with the apparent
working of actual economies in any but the longest time horizons —
specifically,that money is not neutral, that trade-off s exist, and that
policy matters for real economic outcomes.
Section I re—emphasizes the connection between macroeconomic thinking
and actual economic experience, and in particular relates the rise of the
new classical macroeconomics to the experience of price inflation in the
1960s and 1970s. Section II reviews the main assumptions and conclusions
of the new classical macroeconomics, and compares these conclusions to the
observed results of the disinflation policy pursued in the early l980s.
Section III summarizes the implications of this comparison, and calls atten-
tion to several new directions in macroeconomic thinking —eachbearing
different policy conclusions than the new classical macroeconomics —that
have already emerged.—3—
I. The New Classical Macroeconomics in the Context of Macroeconomic Experience
Major developments in economic thinking often owe as much to the
influence of actual economic events as to the internal momentum of scientific
discovery building on itself. The attitudes that economic theories embody
toward the role of government are a particular case in point. Forexample,
a society's live experience of the consequences of uncontrolled negative
externalities like air pollution or unsafe driving often spawns an era of
fertile thinking about the benefits of authoritative intervention. Conversely,
realized disappointment over ineffective or even counterproductive goverent
correctives typically renews interest, at the abstract level as well as
the practical, in the power of the market mechanism.
Macroeconomics has always displayed a special responsiveness to
the tide of prevailing economic circumstances. One cause of this sensitivity,
of course, is simply that the goal of so much of macroeconomic analysis is
to address the potential role (or lack thereof) for government policy.
Another factor, often overlooked but of substantial importance nonethless, is
the commonality of the macroeconomic experience in the modern economy. Specific
industries and geographic regions display great heterogeneity, to be sure, but
the major macroeconomic events —prosperityor contraction, stability or
volatility, inflation or steady prices —emerge, recede, and re-emerge
in importance at roughly the same time to almost everyone in the society,
including its economists. Moreover, increasing interdependence among
nationst economies in the modern world has kept pace with the erosion
of international impediments to scientific exchange, so that much of the
commonality of experience that matters in this context also extends well
beyond the economists of any one country.
As a result, the history of macroeconomics is in many respects—4—
amirror of macroeconomic history. As early as the first decades of
the nineteenth century, problems of wartime finance and its aftermath
stimulated interest in price inflation and the role of money, and not
much later the evolution of the modern banking system fostered new and
different thinking on closely related issues. The continuing clash of
agrarian and industrial interests, virtually throughout the nineteenth
century, powerfully set the stage for the development of new fundamental
ideas on free trade versus protection. The worldwide depression of the
l930s, perhaps the most striking example of this kind of influence, led
to whole new concepts based on sticky prices and realized excess demands
in place of the earlier progressive refinement of neoclassical ideas
appropriate to a fully employed economy with flexible prices. Since
World War II macroeconomists have focused —again,not just in
recognizable attempts to be "practical," but in basic theoretical work
as 1l —ona series of emerging conditions in the actual economic environ-
ment, including irregularly periodic business contractions, persistent and
accelerating price inflation, disappointing productivity trends and, most
recently, external shocks imposed via prices of cartelized raw materials.
Probably the most interesting development at thefundamental
level of macroeconomics in recent years, and certainly the most challenging
along several dimensions, has been the emergence of the "new classical
macroeconomics." This line of research, as the label in part suggests,
uses a combination of theoretical insights and specific assumptions, often
along with modern mathematical and statistical tools, to establish in a
more dramatic way the policy ineffectiveness propositions previously
associated with an earlier analysis.
several distinguishing features of this line of thinking have—5—
importantly enhanced its attractiveness. The rigor of the explicit
optimizing framework it imposes, for example, creates a proliferation
of research opportunities at the theoretical level, includingpotentially
important new avenues for the integration of macro- with micro-economics.
In addition, the set of restrictions it delivers on observable outcomes
presents both challenges to and opportunities for research on the
methodology of statistical inference. As a corollary, of course, it also
presents an entire agenda for applied empirical research. Still, even
these substantial implications of this new line of thinking cannot fully
account —indeed,nor should they —forits proven attractiveness among
macroeconomists.
The main reason why the new classical macroeconomics has proved
so broadly compelling is that it connects in a direct way to specific
questions and problems that macroeconomists have addressed, often with
sharply diverging answers, since at least the mid 1960s: Does monetary
policy affect real economic outcomes? Is there scope for macroeconomic
choice in the usual sense of policy trade—off s? Are whatever trade—of fs
the economy presents exploitable? Does the framework defining monetary
policy decisions and actions matter? Is disinflation costly?
The principal innovators in the new classical macroeconomics,
Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, have both written delineating the emergence
of this line of thinking as a scientific phenomenon.1 Lucas' account
places this development in the context of the evolution of general
equilibrium theory broadly construed, embracing the flow of ideas both in
economics and in related disciplines, while Sargent's emphasizes prior
steps in statistical methodology. Both convey a useful sense of the
axiomatic dimension of the cumulative process characteristic of scientific—6—
inquiry.
Nevertheless, macroeconomic ideas rarely develop in isolation from
the unfolding of actual economic events, and in this case too what has
doubtless provided the real thrust behind the advance of the new classical
macroeconomics has been the power and relevance of its conclusions about
economic behavior in the context of currently pressing questions about
economic policy. As Lucas and Sargent writing together have emphasized,
the new classical economics is intended as a replacement for a previously
prevailing consensus paradigm that bore implications which, in their view,
economic experience plainly falsified.2 As is clear in their joint paper
as well as throughout Lucas' earlier writings,3 the central economic
"event" motivating this development was the acceleration of price inflation
during the 1960s and l970s.
More precisely, the central motivating factor has been the apparent
contradiction between, on the one hand, the observation of upward drift
in the inflation rate over time and, on the other, the "Keynesian" conclusion
that macroeconomic policy could indefinitely maintain higher trend levels
of output and employment at the cost of a higher, but nonetheless stable,
inflation rate. In their joint paper Lucas and Sargent highlight this
experience as a "decisive test" of the earlier views, as embodied in the
macroeconometric models of the time, arid label the contradiction between
these views and the observed outcome "spectacular" and "wildly incorrect" —
an"econometric failure on a grandscale."More recently Lucas has argued,
on thebasis of this same contradiction, that the earlier approachwas
"in deep trouble, the deepest kind of trouble in which an applied body of
theory can find itself: It appears to be giving seriously wrong answers
to the most basic questions of macroeconomicpolicy."4—7—
That the experience of two decades apparently contrasted with such
an important policy implication of Keynesian macroeconomic thinking
(actually, a post—Keynesian synthesis of Keynesian and neoclassical ideas)
clearly testified to the need for substantial modification at a minimum,
and perhaps wholesale replacement. That the aspect of economic behavior
most obviously at issue in accounting for the apparent inconsistency
between actual experience and the earlier macroeconomic paradigm
the dynamic interaction between expectations and labor supply decisions
—wasalso the principal focus of the new paradigm, immediately drew
the latter way of thinking into the vacuum created by rejecting the
former.
The link between the new classical macroeconomics and the debate
over the stability of the inflation-unemployment trade-off —or,put the
other way around, the "acceleratjonjst" debate —isclear enough. As
Phelps and Friedman had pointed out early on, the stability of the
"Phillips curve" summarizing wage (and hence price) setting behavior
rested on the assumed failure of workers or their agents to recognize,
and respond to, the implications of inflation for their real wages.5
In addition, as an early contribution by Lucas showed,6 and as Sargent's
recent paper emphasizes, this important aspect of economic behavior
had a close parallel in the problem of statistically modeling expectations
and slow adjustments. Through an evolution that is now familiar history,
7
the solution proposed by Lucas, drawing on Muth's earlier work, in time
became the new classical macroeconomics.
What is striking in all this —thoughhardly surprising, in light
of the history of macroeconomics —isthe importance of a specific
economic "event" both in motivating a new line of analysis and in making—8—
it attractive to large numbers of researchers. The "great inflation"
of the 1960s and l970s was hardly as shocking an event as the "great
depression" of the 1930s, but each in its turn profoundly affected economic
thinking just as it realigned political priorities and allegiances. In
response to persistent inflation, macroeconomists have chosen new questions
andlookedfor new answers. For many, the way of seeking those answers
has been the new clssical macroeconomics.
what one economic "event" can do, however, another can undo —
atleast in some respects. Because empirical evidence can disconfirm
a theory but, strictly speaking, can never confirm one, scientifically
operational hypotheses are like Humpty—Dumpties. To the extent that the
experience of the 1960s and l970s really disproved the then—prevailing
macroeconomic consensus, no subsequent experience can restore it. By
contrast, further experience can equally damage the new classical economics.
An important question that macroeconomics faces today is whether the
experience of the early l980s has already done so.—9—
II. The New Classical Macroeconomics and Recent Macroeconomic Experience
Has the economic experience of the early 1980s provided yet another
major economic "event" to change the course of macroeconomic thinking?
In order to decide even whether a test of the new classical economics
has occurred, it is first necessary to determine the chief implications
of that line of thinking for observable economic behavior.
The proposition of the new classical macroeconomics that most
closely corresponds to the earlier promise of a stable inflation—
unemployment trade-off, which Lucas and Sargent take to provide the
basis for the "decisive test" of the earlier "Keynesian" thinking, is the
promise of costless disinflation. These two policy conclusions, offered
respectively by two lines of thinking, share important parallels. Each
addressed that aspect of the macroeconomic condition widely identified
as the primary public policy problem of the time —unemploymentin the
l960s, and inflation in the l970s. Most importantly, each offered the
prospect of solving the policy problem it addressed withQ. incurring
the perceived cost that both economistg and the general public feared
would accompany the most obvious remedies. Certainly by the l960s,
the idea that government policy could reduce unemployment was hardly new;
what was novel was the promise of doing so, permanently, without significantly
inducing inflation. Similarly, in the 1970s the idea that government policy
could slow inflation was not new either; the novelty was the promise of
doing so without significantly raising unemployment, or reducing output
and incomes, even in the short run.
For a would—be science eager to avoid value judgments, the promise
of costless disinflation had special appeal. In place of the earlier
discussion of trade—offs between percentage points of inflation and—10—
point—years of unemployment, policy analysis could now focus strictly on
the inflation problem without considering the consequences of disinflation
for the real economy.
Moreover, analyzing away any real costs was of particular importance
in mounting practical arguments for a disinflationary policy. On the one
side, as Okun and others emphasized,8 most conventional estimates of those
costs were large, ranging from 2 to 6 point—years of unemployment for every
one—point reduction in inflation, with a median just over 3—for—l. Further,
if each 1% change in unemployment corresponded to some 3% in the economy's
real growth, then that median estimate implied that slowing inflation
from, say, 10% to 5% per annum would ultimately cost half a year's
output —hardly a small sum. On the other side, economists werefrustrated
by their failure to provide any persuasive analysis indicating comparable
real costs of inflation itself. Apparently the public's aversion to
inflation, if it was not simply misguided, stemmed more from hard-to-
quantify concerns about the fragility of societal relationships than from
the kinds of costs that comfortably suit economic analysis.
At least in its formal evolution, the new classical macroeconomics
did not start out with the proposition of costless disinflation any more
than the earlier analysis had begun from the idea of a stable long-run
inflation—unemployment trade-off. As is well known, the two basic building
blocks of this line of research are the assumptions that expectations are
"rational" and that supply decisions lead to "full employment" outputand
employment except in the context of specific kinds ofsurprises.9 As is
also well known, both of these propositions depend in turn onstill
more elementary assumptions, including the ideasof individual
optimizing behavior and market clearing that Lucasand Sargent have—11—
emphasized, andothersas well.10 The required "rationality" of expectations,
for example, depends on individuals' not Only using efficiently whatever
information they have but also having enough information to know, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, how the economy works. Similarly,
the "Lucas supply function" depends not only on the flexibility of prices
and wages but also on suppliers' observing their output prices before
observing their input prices.
The achievement of the new classical macroeconomics was to combine
this set of assumptions not just to show that disinflation is costless
but to derive the more general conclusion that anticipated monetary policy
actions do not affect real economic activity, and hence that no trade-off
exists between inflation (or, for that matter, any other nominal magnitude)
and employment or output (or any other real magnitude). Costless disinflation
follows simply as a specific application of the general result.
In a completely atemporal context, it is difficult to know how to
react to these propositions. Indeed, the oxymoron "new classical" itself
suggests this tension. Notwithstanding the l960s view of a "permanent"
inflation—unemployment trade-off, there is nothing either new or surprising
in monetary neutrality propositions that obtain under appropriate conditions
in some sufficiently long run. Apart from Tobin effects,11 which are likely
to be quantitatively small, few economists would argue that the average
rate of money growth maintained over a century would much influence the
level of real economic activity at the century's end, while most would
expect an effect on the average inflation rate over that time. By contrast,
what is new and striking as well as of great practical importance, if
it is true —isthe conclusion of the new classical macroeconomics that
these familiar neutrality propositions obtain in the short run too.—12—
How, then, has the new classical macroeconomics met the "decisive
test" provided by the quest for costless disinflation in the early l980s?
In 1980 the U.S. economy entered a period of protracted weakness involving,
in record short order, two successive business recessions (as identified
in the standard NBER chronology). The economies of other industrialized
western nations exhibited similar, if not even more severe, weakness.
In the United States the utilization of both labor and capital resources
fell to post World war II record lows by yearend 1982, with 10.8% of the
labor force unemployed and 32.7% of industrial capacity idle. While
neither the 1980 recession (the shortest on record) nor the 1981-82
recession (the longest since World War II) was extraordinary individually,
the effect of the two together represented as great an impact on thereal
economy as any business cycle experience in the post—war era.It also
dramatically slowed inflation.
What makes this "event" so immediately relevant to evaluating
the new classical macroeconomics is the important role of monetary policy,
especially after 1980, in bringing it about Business cyclehistorians
will no doubt continue for some time to debate the causes of thebrief
recession in the spring of 1980. The new "monetarist" monetary policy
adopted in October 1979 was a factor, to be sure, but so werethe imposition
of credit controls in March 1980, the movement of the federal budgetinto
surplus on a high—employment basis in 1979, and the doublingof world oil
prices in 1979—80.
By contrast, restrictive monetary policystands out as the primary
force halting the recovery that began in mid 1980. Whethermeasured by
money growth or by interest rate levels, monetarypolicy was tight during
this period. After declining from 8.2% in 1978 to 7.4%in 1979 and 7.2%—13—
in 1980, the growthof the Ml moneystock fell to 5.2% in 1981 —orOnly
2.5% after the Federal Reserve Board's suggested adjustment to reflect
the nationwide authorization of NOW accounts at the year's outset.
Both short- andlong—termnominal interest rates moved to new record
highs at yearend 1980 and remained at those levels until late in 1981.
Moreover, even when nominal interest rates finally declined, they remained
(and, through the time of writing, continue) at unprecedentedly high
levels in relation to the economy's ongoing rate of price inflation. The
primacy of this tight monetary policy stance in bringing about the recession
thatbegan in mid 1981 is all the clearer in that the high—employment federal
budget was moving progressively into deficit, and real oil prices were
falling, throughout this period.
whatimplications, for price inflation and for real economic
activity, does the new classical macroeconomics suggest as a consequence
of this monetary policy? It is always possible to argue, of course, that
that analysis carries no implications at all for the outcome of any such
policy because it is impossible to know whether the policy was anticipated
or not. This response is not satisfactory, however. Although the initial
change in monetary policy in October 1979 may well have caught the public
unaware, the continuation of that policy from late 1980 onward was hardly
a surprise. Especially in the context of the 1980 general election,
the tight monetary policy during this period was probably about as well
anticipated as such a policy is ever likely to be. Because expectations
are unobservable, of course, it is impossible ever to establish definitively
what was and what was not anticipated in advance. Even so, if the new
classical macroeconomics analysis of anticipated monetary policy is not
relevant to U.S. monetary policy during this period, then it is not clear—14—
when—orif ever —thatanalysis is likely to be relevant.
Table 1 summarizes some basic dimensions of u.s. macroeconomic
experience during 1980-82, including not only the slowing of priceinflation
but also the decline in real economic activity. For purposes of establishing
some minimal historical context, the table also tracesthe re—acceleration
of inflation during the years after the 1973-75 recession. The risein
the inflation rate during 1976-80 was gradual at first, then more rapid
as the business expansion carried the economy to higherutilization
levels and finally as international oil prices rose sharply in1979—80.
The subsequent drop in the inflation rate was somewhat sharper,halving it
in twoyears,and thereby more than reversing the entire rise since1975 and
bringinginflationto its slowest pace since 1972.
What about the behavior of real economic activitythat accompanied
this disinflation? Was this experience consistentwith the central
propositions of the new classical macroeconomics?Did the performance
of the real economy bear out the predictionof costless disinflation?
The economic events documented in Table 1 suggest anythingbut
costless disinflation. Instead, they are strikinglyin line with the
conventional estimates of the cost of disinflation surveyed byOkun some
years before the fact.
The slowing of inflation from 10% per annumin 1980 to 5% in 1982
had, just by yearend 1982, required an average
unemployment rate of 7 1/2 %
duringthe three years 1980-82. If the economy was approximatelyat full
employment during 1978—79, when the unemploymentrate was 6% on average,
then the cost through 1982 of about 5 pointsof disinflation was about
5 point-years of unemployment, Stoppingthe accounts at yearend 1982














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the continuing point—years of unemployment that accrue until the economy
returns to full employment. The current federal government projection
as of the time of writing, for example, places the return to 6% (actually
6 1/2 %) unemployment in 1988, with an average of 8 1/2 % of the labor
force unemployed during 1983—88 (and no further slowing of inflation)
This outlook therefore implies an additional 15 point—years of unemployment,
bringing to 20 point-years the total associated with 5 points of disinflation,
for a final trade-off of 4-to—l —toward the pessimistic end of Okun's
range.
it is also possible to construct a more favorable picture on the
basisofmore optimistic assumptions, of course. For example, if the post—
recession business expansion were sufficient to reduce unemployment to
9 1/2 % in 1983, 7 1/2 % in 1984, arid then 6% in 1985 and thereafter —
andall that without any re-acceleration of inflation —thenthe relevant
total would have been "only" 10 point-years of unemployment, implying a
final trade-off of "only" 2-f or-l —aboutat the optimistic end of Okun's
range.
Whether the correct number summarizing the unemployment cost of
disinflation ultimately turns out to be somewhat above or somewhat below
Okun's median estimate is beside the point. What matters is that the
disinflation already has not been, and will not turn out to be, costless.
Experience has belied the most significant policy implication of the new
classical macroeconomics, the implication that, at an important level,
gave this new line of thinking its appeal.
Does this event constitute "a decisive test"? Was the prediction
of costless disinflation "wildly incorrect"? Was the inconsistency between
it and the economy's observed behavior "spectacular," representing—16—
"econometric failure onagrand scale"? Did the analysis that concluded
thatdisinflation was costless give "seriously wrong answers to the most
basic questions of macroeconomic policy"? Is the new classicalmacroeconomics
thereforenow in "the deepest kind of trouble in which an applied body of
theorycan find itself"?
Such terms are difficult to assess, much less to apply. what does
seem clear is that the decline of real economic activity that accompanied
the disinflation of the early1980s has contradicted the chief policy
implicationof the new classicalmacroeconomics just as surely, andjust
as greatly, as the overall upward trend in inflation during the 1960s and
l970scontradicted the chief policy implication of an earlier macroeconomic
analysis.—17—
III. Future Directions for Macroeconomics
Where does macroeconomics go from here? To be sure, the wrong
lesson to draw from the recent experience would be that thinking on the
subject should simply return to its prevailing state of a decade or two
ago, rejecting as a whole all developments associated with the new classical
macroeconomics. In the first instance, the disconfirmation of the costless
disinflation proposition does not eliminate from the empirical record the
earlier disconfirmation of the stable inflation-unemployment trade-off
proposition. Breaking a new eggshell today does not restore to integrity
another eggshell broken yesterday.
More importantly, it is both unnecessary and wrong to reject
every new element introduced by the new classical macroeconomics just
because the specific combination of elements used in that line of research
has led to falsified conclusions. As the discussion above has already
emphasized, the assumptions that people behave in their own self-interest
and that markets clear (in some broad sense) are not by themselves sufficient
to deliver the key results of short-run policy neutrality and costless
disinflation. Those more ambitious results follow only from additional,
more far—reaching assumptions including the availability of sufficient
information, the absence of transactions costs (again in a very broad
sense), and the flexibility of wages and prices.
Moreover, the series of methodological developments initially
associated with the new classical macroeconomics bears little if any
relation to the ultimate behavioral conclusions associated with this line
of research. The emphasis on microeconomic foundations, including in
particular the effort to derive macroeconomic relationships from explicit
models of individual behavior, is one example. This approach to macroeconomics—18—
is not without costs, of course, including (at least to date) the need
to assume away aggregation issues as well as to ignore valid aspects of
the individual behavioral environment, like transactions costs, which would
render formal analysis iritractible. Nevertheless, in many contexts these
costs may well be worth incurring in order to exploit the power of the
available microeconomic theory. Another example is the use of empirical
estimation methods that exploit the theory underlying a multi-equation
model to impose cross—equation restrictions on the admissible parameter
values. Here too there are costs, but in many contexts they may be
justified by the resulting advantages in terms of more rigorous hypothesis
testing or, under a maintained hypothesis, better quantitative estimates.
The important point is to distinguish these and other methodological
developments in macroeconomic thinking from the context of the policy
conclusions derived by the new classical macroeconomics under quite specific,
and in some cases implausible, assumptions. Genuine methodological
advances are applicable more broadly. The current direction of macroeconomic
research is not abandoning these developments, nor is the future direction
of research in the field likely to do so.
At the same time, if macroeconomics is not simply to continue to
focus on a framework that delivers falsified conclusions, important
departures from the new classical macroeconomics are clearly necessary.
In part those departures are already in progress. At least to date, two
major themes -onebased on the costs of decisions and transactions,
and the other based on informational limitations and asymmetries —have
predominated. These themes have appeared separately and also in conjunction.
Early on in the debate over the then emerging new classical macro-
economics, Phelps and Taylor as well as Fischer pointed out the necessityof the price flexibility assumption for the policy neutralityconclusion.13
The specific context of this and the ensuing literature was the existence
of fixed nominal wage contracts, perhaps the most obvious violation of
the flexibility assumption in modern western economies, but the point
at issue really applies to sticky wages and prices of any kind, anywhere
within the system. As economists have known for decades, stickiness of
wages and/or prices matters importantly, and the associated implications
are no less striking in the context of the methods and other assumptions
typical of the new classical macroeconomics. Indeed, wages or prices
set for fixed but overlapping time periods are sufficient, even within
this framework of anaysis, to generate persistent inflation and real
activity effects that last well beyond the length of the longest contract,
as well as business cycles in the sense of policy or other effects on real
14
economic activity that first build before subsiding.
Moreover, price and wage inflexibility is itself just aninstance
of the broader theme of decision and transactions costs. In the spirit
of the new classical macroeconomics, it is helpful not just to accept
sticky wages and prices as a fact but to seek additional insightsfrom
trying to understand the reasons behind their existence. Someeconomic
rationale often underlies the form of society's institutional arrangements.
In this case the prevalence of arrangements setting inflexible wages or
prices for either fixed or indefinite periods of time rio doubtreflects
the costs of making decisions, including the costs of gathering the
information needed for decision making. In the presence of such costs,
even an economy made up entirely of people who optimize their owninterests
within optimally chosen arrangements will fail to exhibit the central
15
properties claimed by the new classical macroeconomics.—20—
Issuesof information availability not Only provide a basis for
wage and price stickiness but also constitute yet a further potential
avenue for using the methods of the new classical macroeconomics without
proceeding to its empirically falsified conclusions. Even under the
maintained assumption that only deviations of outcomes from the associated
prior expectations affect real economic activity, an important question
is the basis on which those prior expectations are formed. What especially
matters in the context of the potential role of monetary policy is whether
thecentral bank, and the people whose behavior more proximately matters
for decisions affecting output, share the same basis for forming expectations.'6
Ifnot, then even systematic monetary policy is not neutral with respect
to real economic activity.
Moreover, if the respective information differential between the
central bankandthe relevant parts of the economy's private sector is
such as to favor (in a minimum-variance sense) the central bank, then
monetary policy will be able to exploit the resulting nonneutrality.
Especially since the presumed sign of the effect of surprises on output
decisions in this analysis makes sense primarily in the context of the
decisions of households, rather than of businesses or of traders in
financial markets, an information differential in the required direction
is hardly implausible. Once again, much of the method and analytical body
of the new classical macroeconomics can still obtain (here even including the
price flexibility assumption), yet the end result of the analysis is an
altogether different set of policy conclusions.
Finally, the transactions cost theme and the information availability
theme blend in other ways as well. A third direction for subsequent
macroeconomic research is to emphasize the actual process of making and—21—
coordinating decisions in the modern, large-scale market economy. One
wayto view wages or price stickiness, for example, is simply as the
resultof the private sector's being able to take and implement price and
output decisions at less frequent intervals than the central bank can
taiceand implement monetary policy decisions. other element in this
line of thinking is to recognize the impossibility of fully simultaneous
decision making among all relevant actors throughout the market economy.
Blanchard,for example, has shown that the lack of synchronization of price
and production decisions is itself sufficient to lead to different policy
conclusions,even within a remaining context drawnentirely from the new
17 classical macroe cononucs.
Whathas already emerged from recent research, therefore, is the extreme
fragility of the central policy conclusions of the new classical macroeconomics.
Under even small and apparently reasonable modifications in the underlying
assumptions, a fully corresponding analysis indicates that money is not
neutral, that systematic policy affects real output and employment, and
that trade-off s exist —andthat disinflation is not costless. If the
objective of the analysis were to defend the specific policy conclusions
of the new classical macroeconomics, recent trends in macroeconomic research
would be as distressing at the theoretical level as the actual experience
of disinflation in the early l9BOs has been at the empirical level.
If the objective is instead to gain an even better understanding
of how the macroeconomy works, however, these new directions are likely
to prove constructive. They show that it is possible to exploit what is useful
from the advances of the previous decade without following an inevitable
pathto empirically falsified results.
Inthe light of how macroeconomics has always developed, all this—22—
is not surprising. The respective disappointments over the economy's
failure to recover quickly from the depression of the 1930s and then
to avoid inflation in the l960s and l970s in both cases led to substantial
rethinking, and now so too has the failure to achieve costless disinflation
in the early 1980s. It is this responsiveness to actual economic events,
just as much as the cumulative nature of scientific thinking in the
abstract, that gives macroeconomics its vitality.Footnotes
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